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IS IT A TORT TO CREATE AN OBLIGATION AGAINST A THIRD
PARTY, WITHOUT RIGHT OR HIS CONSENT, WHEREBY
ANOTHER MAY RIGHTFULLY DEPRIVE HIM OF
HIS PROPERTY?
A holder of a negotiable instrument with notice of fraud,
claiming under the defrauder and another having notice of the
fraud, has passed it on to a bona fide purchaser without notice.
Can he be held by the defrauded party in a quasi-contract action
for money had and received, even before the obligation has
been met by the plaintiff?
It is well settled that a holder with notice, not claiming under
a bona fide purchaser for value, may not recover from the
defrauded party on the instrument.' The personal creditor of
'Mooney v. Mooney Co,, 128 Pac. (Wash.) 225; First Natl Bank v.
Flour City Co., 136 N. W. (Minn.) 563; Shur v. Hall & Lyon Co., 88
AtI. (R. I.) 8oi.
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the treasurer or other fiscal officer of a corporation is held to
have notice that such officer is misappropriating the funds of
the corporation when he attempts to meet his debt with a cor-
poration check or note.2 But the cases have gone further. Such
creditor, having accepted the check or note and realized on it,
is liable to the corporation in an action for money had and
received. 3  We have a different question before us. Suppose
such creditor passes the instrument on to A for value, making
him acquainted, however, with the whole situation; then suppose
A passes it on to a bona fide holder for value, without notice,'
who collects from the corporation; may the corporation recover
from A in indebitatus assumpsit?
'What is the basis of this quasi-contract action in which the
defrauded party recovers from the personal creditor? The cases
say that it is because he has gotten money to which he knows
he has no right, and because he knows of the officer's disability
so to use his principal's funds.3 The courts do not hesitate to
give this relief because of considerations of public policy, for
the negotiability of instruments is interfered with in no way.
But there seem to be more fundamental bases for these decisions.
In the first place, the creditor, so long as he has the check or
note in his own hands, is a converter of nothing but the actual
paper itself. In his hands it is worth only a fraction of a cent,
the value of the paper, and in an action of trover it is submitted
that damages should be only one cent.' He does not have legal
2 Rochester & C. T. R. Co. v. Paviour, 164 N. Y. 281; Lanning v. Trust
Co. of America, 127 N. Y. Supp. 485.
'Reynolds v. Gerdelman, 170 S. W. (Mo.) 153, semble; St. Louis
Charcoal Co. v. Lewis, 54 Mo. App. 548; Lampson v. Beard, 94 Fed.
30; Ward v. City Trust Co., 192 N. Y. 61.
'A corporation check drawn by its fiscal officer does not carry on its
face notice of any infirmities. Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 1o Wall.644.
'Buck v. Kent, 3 Vt. 99, allows a recovery of the face value of the
instrument in an action for conversion, as do several other cases. How-
ever, it seems obvious that so long as the note is in the hands of one
against whom the maker has a defense, the maker has been deprived
of nothing but a piece of paper. As Justice Holmes says, in Danforth v.
Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, "Perhaps the reasoning of the cases
has not always been as sound as the instinct which directed the
decisions." There has been no technical conversion of anything equal
to the face value of the note. Some cases can be distinguished, for
example, Inhabitants of Otisfield v. Mayberry, 63 Me. 197, where the
note was paid, but the holder refused to give it up.
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title to the instrument, for there has been no contract between
him and the corporation. The fiscal agent had no actual
authority to pass title from his principal to the creditor, and
the creditor is in no position to claim that he had apparent
authority. But the fact that the creditor does not himself have
legal title does not preclude him from vesting legal title in an
innocent purchaser, in accordance with the doctrines of the law
merchant.6 Along with possession of the paper he has the
power, by passing the instrument into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice, of creating in that purchaser
a right against the corporation to which the corporation has no
defense, yet which was created without its consent. Depriving
another of his property, without right and without his consent,
is a tort-conversion. Why is not the creation of an obligation,
without right or consent, whereby another may rightfully deprive
him of his property, also a tort? The corporation is entitled
to an injunction in equity to restrain the creditor from passing
it on to an innocent purchaser. 7  This tort (not conversion)
the creation of a liability in the corporation, without right, and
against its will--is the tort which is waived by the corporation
when it sues in indebitatus assumpsit.
But now suppose, instead of passing it on to a bona fide
purchaser, that the creditor sells it to A, with notice. Is not
A in a position exactly analogous to that of the creditor above?
And when he passes it on to a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice, is there any reason why he should not be held,
just as the creditor himself would be?
This position is strengthened by the recent case of Hamlin's
Wizard Oil Co. v. U. S. Express Co." In that case the payee's
The reason for this doctrine is that same public policy which gave
rise to (a) market overt; (b) "money carries a clear title"; (c) the
doctrine that a vendor, retaining possession after a sale to one person
(by which that person gets title), may by subsequent acts vest title in
another; (d) the Recording Acts, according to which one retaining title
on the books, although it is actually in another, may transfer it to a
third party; (e) the rule that one having ostensible, though not actual,
authority to pass title may vest it in a third party, although contrary
to the explicit, but secret, instructions of the true owner.
'In Schmidt v. Vest, 104 Fed. 272, the maker's name had been forged,
and although the instrument could never be valid in anyone's hands,
equity restrained its negotiation. A fortiori in this case, where it becomes
valid in the hands of an innocent purchaser.
a io6 N. E. (Ill.) 623.
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indorsement was forged and the instrument came into B's hands.
B had negotiated for value, being without knowledge of any
irregularity. But he had committed a technical conversion,
having constructive notice. The payee waived the tort and
recovered in indebitatus assumpsit. In that case the defendant
was morally guiltless; in ours he was conscious of his unjust
enrichment. In that, the plaintiff might have had recourse to
his original debtor on the original contract, and also to the tort-
feasor; in this, the corporation has recourse only against its
treasurer, the tort-feasor.9
It is not necessary that the corporation should have been forced
to meet the obligation before suit brought, for, in determining
the measure of damages in an action, the plaintiff may show
that he is under a liability to pay to another, as a result of the
defendant's breach of duty, although he has not yet paid.10
It is submitted that a defrauded party may recover in an
action of indebitatus assumpsit from anyone claiming under the
defrauder and having notice of the fraud, if such person has
negotiated the instrument to a bona fide purchaser for value.
SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS BY A BONA FIDE SOCIAL
CLUB WITHOUT A LICENSE.
There has been a great conflict in the cases on this subject
in the past. Recently two more cases have been added to tie
already large number.' The first case deals with an unincor-
9If the corporation waives his tort and recovers from him in assumpsit,
of course it may not recover from the creditor. Security Co. v. Amer.
Exch. Natl Bank, lO3 N. Y. Supp. 399.
"Josling v. Irvine, 6 H. & N. 512. (Liability arose because of plaintiff's
inability to deliver goods, due to defendant's breach of contract.)
Randall v. Raper, E. B. & E. 84. (Plaintiff's vendee claims compensa-
tion from plaintiff on a warranty. Defendant sold to plaintiff on same
warranty.) Spark v. Heslop, I E. & E. 563. (Defendant agreed to
answer to plaintiff for all expenses undergone in maintaining a certain
suit. Held, plaintiff may recover the amount of his attorney's bill,
which has been rendered, but not paid.) Richardson v. Chasen, IO
Q. B. 756. (Action for breach of agreement to assign a lease. Plaintiff
recovers the bill of costs due his attorney for investigating the title,
though such bill was not paid before action was brought.)
1Gevinis v. State, 1o7 N. E. (Ind.) 78; and Commonwealth v. Woelz,
io6 N. E. (Mass.) 56o.
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porated club, and the second with an incorporated club. Both
hold that the transfer of liquor by the club to a member con-
stitutes an illegal sale and is a misdemeanor.
The facts of the first case are briefly these: the club was
a social order, unincorporated, having rooms and equipment.
Appellant was steward, having charge of the liquors, which had
been purchased with club money. The plan of disposing of the
liquor was to sell tickets or coupons (to lodge members only)
which were good in exchange for definite quantities of liquor.
There was no profit and the club had a select membership. The
court held that when the liquor was purchased it belonged to
the club members in common, and when a member received a
definite portion, if belonged to him and that this constituted a
sale within the meaning of the Statute forbidding sales without
a license.
The second case differed from the first only in the fact that
the club was incorporated. "In the present case the beer was
owned not by the members but by the corporation, which is a
distinct legal entity. . . . He (member) had no individual
right or interest in the liquors owned by the corporation. In
short, the transaction discloses the transfer of property from
one person to another for a consideration of value, or a 'sale'
in the ordinary meaning of the word."
Are these two cases right? On the first question, where the
club is unincorporated, the decisions and courts are in hopeless
conflict as to whether the transaction is a sale. The courts of
Massachusetts have held that such a transaction is not a sale,
but that it is merely a method of distributing common property.'
So have the courts of other states.3 Is this view sound? Whose
property is it when it is purchased with the club funds? It
is the property of all in common? Each one has as much right
to it as the next member. When the liquor is drawn off, and
the member passes over his coupon or money, the title to the
property has changed, from an undivided interest with the other
members to an absolute ownership of the amount in question.
This transaction contains all the elements of sale, call it what
' Coin. v. Smith, IO2 Mass. 144; Coin. v. Pornphret, 137 Mass. 564.
'Barden v. Montana Club, io Mont. 330; Graff v. Evans, 8 Q. B. 373;
Davies v. Bennett, i K. B. 666; Klein v. Livingston, 177 Pa. 224; Lein
v. State, 55 Md. 566; People v. Adelphi Club, 149 N. Y. 5; State v.
McMaster, 35 S. C. .
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you will. 4 "Each received liquor which mostly belonged to
others and in which he had a minute undivided interest. For his
money he received in exchange liquor which belonged to several
others as well as to himself and converted it to his sole and
separate use. This is surely a sale."5  To say that the liquor
when bought belonged to all in common and by a transaction
which vests the title free from the interests of all others, therein
is not sold would be flying right in the face of what the com-
munity regards as a sale and what the very ones who receive
the liquor at the club regard as a sale. "I content myself with
saying briefly, that I agree with the general opinion of the
community." 6
Now let us consider the attitude of the courts when the club
is an incorporated one. By far the great weight of authority,
and reason, consider such a transaction a sale.7 The legal title
to the liquor, purchased with the corporate funds, is in the
corporation. By the transaction, the title is vested in the indi-
vidual. This certainly contains all the elements of a sale. "An
'People v. Law & Order Club, 203 Ill. 127; Mannont v. State, 48
Ind. 21, semble; Martin v. State, 59 Ala. 34; Russel v. State, 116
Pac. (Wyo.) 451; Nogales Club v. State, 69 Miss. 218; People v. Bradley,
58 Hun 6oi, semble; U. S. v. Alexis Club, 98 Fed. 725; State v. Neis,
io8 N. C. 787; Manning v. City of Canon City, 45 Colo. 571.
State v. Neis, io8 N. C. 787.
'McPherson, J., in U. S. v. Alexis, 98 Fed. 725.
'Martin v. State, 59 Ala. 34; Newark v. Essex Club, 53 N. 3. L. 99;
State v. Lockyear, 95 N. C. 633; County v. Boise Club, 2o Idaho 421;
United States v. Alexis Club, 98 Fed. 725; Country Club v. People, 228
Ill. 75; People v. Soule, 74 Mich. 2o5; State v. Robinson, 163 Mo. App.
221; Cusner v. California Club, IoO Pac. (Cal.) 868 (holding that the
statute does not apply to clubs who do not sell as a business); City of
Spokane v. Banighman, 54 Wash. 315; State v. Klein, 93 Pac. (Ore.)
237; State v. Mudie, 115 N. W. (S. Dak.) lO7; Beauvoir Club v. State,
42 So. (Ala.) 1O4O; State v. Honcek, 41 Kans. 87; State v. Shumate,
44 W. Va. 49o; Commonwealth v. Woelz, io6 N. E. (Mass.) 56o; Mohrman
v. State, 1O5 Ga. 7og; State v. Maryland Club, lO5 Md. 585; So. Shore
Country Club v. People, 228 Ill. 75; State v. Minnesota Club, io6 Minn.
5,5; Chesapeake Club v. State, 63 Md. 446; University Club v. City of
Louisville, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 9o2; Hermitage Club v. Shelton, 1O4 Tenn. IOI;
Army and Navy Club, 8 App. D. C. 544. Contra, Graff v. Evans, 8
Q. B. D. 373; Davies v. Bennett, (19o2) i K. B. 666; People v. Adelphi
Club, 149 N. Y. 5; Klein v. Livingston, 177 Pa. 204; Piedmont Club v.
Commonwealth, 87 Va. 541; State v. Austin Club, 89 Tex. 20; Barden v.
Montana Club, IO Mont. 330; State v. McMaster, 35 S. C. i. Black on
Intoxicating Liquors, Sec. 142.
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essential difference between a corporation and a partnership is
that the corporators have no legal title or interest in the corporate
property, while the real and personal estate of the partnership
is held by the partners. Shareholders are not tenants in common
or co-owners of the property of the corporation in any sense;
but the title thereto rests in the legal entity, called the
'corporation."' 8
On the other hand, the following is the basis of the view that
it is not a sale. "The society is not a trading corporation but
a voluntary association for social purposes. Each member is
elected and each is a joint owner of all the corporate property
and assets. Liquors are not sold to him by the corporation, but
furnished him by the steward upon his paying into the common
fund the cost of the article furnished."' This view is unsound
because it assumes the title to corporate property is in the
members of the club and not in the corporation. The same is
true of the following extract: "Club buys the liquors and dis-
tributes them to members who pay for what they drink. They
are all owners of the property in equal shares when purchased.
Some drink; some do not. The one who drinks the others'
shares puts back the value of these shares in the common
treasury, for they are all owners of the property in equal shares
when purchased. Therefore, the distribution is made equal by
contribution. This does not constitute a sale. There is no
element of bargain; only a method of distribution of common
property."'1
There are cases in which the decisions of the courts are based
on the idea that a bona fide social club was not a public place
within the meaning of statutes prohibiting the sale of liquor in
public places or as a business.'
In State v. Warcholik,'2 the court said that, granting for
the moment that a sale may be made to a rmember, it cannot
be made to a non-member'without a license, though the sale was
made in the bona fide belief that the man was a member.
It would seem that both the cases cited in the beginning are
correctly decided.
'State v. Nurdie, 115 N. W. (S. Dak.) lO7.
'Leh v. State, 55 Md. 566.
"Klein v. Livingston Club, 177 Pa. St. 224.
' Grant v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 527; State v. Austin Club, 89 Tex.
2o; Manassas Club v. City, 121 Ala. 561.
'So Conn. 351.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A PAROL CONTRACT FOR THE
SALE OF LAND.
The question of when a parol contract for the sale of land
will be taken out of the Statute of Frauds is one of great
interest and upon which the cases are greatly in conflict. To add
to the difficulties is the fact that the cases abound in dicta, often
grossly inaccurate. The cases themselves, while they may be
fundamentally correct, often give enormous grounds for the
decisions.
But the mass of cases, taken as a whole, show the growth
and trend of the doctrine, and though the results arrived at
vary in different jurisdictions, it is chiefly because the courts
have not all advanced to the same point of progress. It is here
proposed to trace the evolution of the doctrine.
The statute was passed in order to avoid frauds and perjuries,
which were but too frequently met with in actions regarding
lands. It was felt that a contract for the sale of the land should
be evidenced by something more definite and certain than mere
parol testimony, which, owing to the fact that neither party
could testify in his own behalf, could be easily manufactured
by an unscrupulous and designing plaintiff. But it was soon
seen that the statute had another effect; it enabled a vendor
to defraud an innocent purchaser, who in reliance upon oral
promises had entered into the possession of the land, by later
setting up the statute to prevent the purchaser from obtaining
specific performance of the contract.
The courts of equity therefore, soon after the passage of the
statute, gave specific performance in a number of cases, giving
no reasons for it," or else giving the very general reason that
it would be a fraud upon the vendee not to do so.2 In Clynan
v. Cooke' the Lord Chancellor allowed specific performance on
the ground that "if upon a parol agreement a man is admitted
into possession, he is made a trespasser, and is liable to answer
as a trespasser if there be no agreement. For the purpose of
defending himself, such evidence (i. e. of the parol agreement)
was admissible, and if it was admissible for such purpose, there
is no reason why it should not be admissible throughout. That,
I apprehend, is the ground on which courts of equity have pro-
1 Butcher v. Stapeley, i Vernon 363; Pyke v. Williams, 2 Vernon 456;
Earl of Aylesford's Case, i Geo. 2. See 26 Harv. L. Rev. 343.
'Attorney General v. Day, I Ves. 218.
3 I Sch. & Lef. 22. Contra, Glass v. Hulbut, 102 Mass. 24.
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ceeded in permitting the partial performance of an agreement
to be a ground for avoiding the statute." This manifestly is
incorrect, as the court might well admit evidence of the parol
agreement as a defense to an action of trespass without violating
in the least the express terms of the statute. But to go beyond
this and allow the purchaser to sue for specific performance
goes further than is required for his protection on that ground.
This erroneous reason was also given in Gregory v. Mitchell,4
though the court there indicated the true ground, namely, that
the plaintiff had been permitted to make expenditures upon the
premises and it would be unjust to him if the defendant should
not go on with the contract. Thereafter the courts abandoned
this erroneous reason and allowed specific performance on the
ground of constructive fraud. Great injustice would arise if
a party were permitted to escape from the engagements he
had entered into, upon the ground of the Statute of Frauds,
after the other party had, upon the faith of such agreement,
expended his 'money or otherwise acted in execution of the
agreement.
But, as said in Givens v. Calder,6 the judges became very
astute in laying hold of circumstances in order to enforce parol
agreements. In avoiding Scylla they were in peril of Charybdis.
Just as parol evidence had been a source of fraud before the
statute, so now thie admission of evidence of the parol contract
under which the plaintiff alleged he had acted had become pro-
ductive of frauds. There was a great outcry against the former
laxity of the courts. The judges began to insist that if a party
set up part performance, he must show acts unequivocally refer-
ring to and resulting from that agreement.7 The pendulum is
never swung in the opposite direction without being swung too
far. In their insistence upon unequivocal proof of the contract,
the courts failed to scrutinize carefully the alleged fraud. As a
result countless cases granted specific performance where the
fraud could be adequately remedied at law and where, therefore,
there was no need for specific performance. 8 And many a plain-
tiff was-refused specific performance because the parol contract
was not evidenced by such acts as were deemed to be "unequivo-
418 Ves. 328.
'Mundy v. Joliffe, 5 Myl. & Cr. I67.
'Desaus Ch. Rep. 171.
'Boyd v. Cleghorn, 94 Va. 780; Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. & Lef. i;
Morphett v. Jones, i Swanst. 172; Phillips z- Thompson, i Johns. Ch. 13.
'Andrews v. Babcock, 63 Conn. lO9; 36 Cyc. 654.
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cal evidence of the contract" even though the court itself
acknowledged that there was no other adequate remedy.9
But the pendulum is now swinging back. The courts are less
ready to grant specific performance and prefer either to leave
the party to his remedy at law, or themselves to give compensa-
tion and not specific performance.10 But when specific per-
formance is the only adequate remedy, the courts are more ready
to grant it," even though the vendee has not been let into pos-
session,12 an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of
a suit for specific performance in the earlier cases, and indeed
still so in those jurisdictions which cling to the evidential aspect
of the question.' 8
Our courts are constantly striving to approximate absolute
justice. Where there is a wrong, then they desire to give a
remedy. The trend of the better modern decisions is in accord-
ance with this. Where the plaintiff can satisfactorily show
that a parol contract was entered into, and that it would be
inequitable for the defendant to refuse to perform, there they
will decree specific performance. They neither cling to the
severe evidential rules of the older decisions, nor will they grant
specific performance where they can give other adequate relief.
Is the Statute of Frauds nullified by this doctrine and if not,
on what does the plaintiff sue, since he cannot sue upon the
parol contract? The basis of the action is equitable fraud. The
suit is not upon the contract,' 4 but upon the equities arising
from the inequitable conduct of the defendant.'5 Thus the
authority of the statute is upheld as a shield, while by a careful
and discriminating application of the doctrine, it is prevented
from being used as a sword.
This modem view of the rule was adopted and followed in
the recent case of Clinchfield Coal Corporation v. Steinman, 217
Fed. Rep. 875.
'Maddison v. Alderson, L. R. 8 A. C. 467.
1 Pankhurst v. Van Cortlandt, i Johns. Ch. 273; Forrister v. Sullivan,
132 S. W. (Mo.) 722; Weeks v. Land, 69 N. H. 78; Cooper v. Colsom,
66 N. J. Eq. 328; Gallagher v. Gallagher, 31 W. Va. 9; Burns v. Daggett,
141 Mass. 368.
'Johnson v. Riseberg, 33 N. W. (Neb.) 183; Bridgewater v. Hooks,
159 S. W. (Tex.) loo8; Fred v. Asbury, 152 S. W. (Ark.) 155.
2 Gladville v. McDole, 247 I1. 34.
Maddison v. Alderson, L. R. 8 A. C. 467.
1" Contra. "Part performance will take the case out of the statute and
support the suit on the agreement." Brown v. Pinniger, 81 N. J. Eq. 229.
"Maddison v. Alderson, L. R. 8 A. C. 467; Gladville v. McDole, 247
Ill. 34.
